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In this note, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite normal form games with
compact sets of strategies and continuous payoffs by constructing Nash mappings.
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1. Introduction
In the two seminal papers [1,2], Nash introduced a concept of equilibrium points as a natural solution concept for
non-cooperative games and established the existence of equilibria in all finite games; especially, the proof in [2] based
directly on the Brouwer theorem is a considerable improvement over the earlier version in [1] based on Kakutani fixed
point theorem. In fact, in Nash’s unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation [3], there are two interpretations of equilibrium concept
for non-cooperative games, one rationalistic and onemass-action. However, the former is ‘‘quite strongly a rationalistic and
idealizing interpretation’’, while the latter is more realistic and appropriate.
The mass-action view, as described by Weibull in [4], suggests that ‘‘Nash equilibria could be identified as stationary,
or perhaps dynamically stable, population states in dynamic models of boundedly rational strategy adaptation in large
strategically interactions populations’’. In detail, consider a finite n-player game G: Let Ai be the pure strategy set of players
position i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, Si be its mixed strategy simplex, the expected payoff to player position i when a profile
s ∈ S = Πi∈ISi is played be denoted πi(s), while πiα(s) denotes the payoff to player i when he uses pure strategy α ∈ Ai
against the profile s ∈ S. Now let the game be played over and over again by individuals who are randomly drawn from
infinitely large populations, one population for each player position i in the game, while a population state for any time t is
then formally identical with a mixed strategy profile s(t) ∈ S. Then, if a population state s is stationary (i.e, s(t) = s for all
t , or s˙iα(t) = 0 for all i, α) under the following dynamics:
s˙iα(t) = π+iα (s)− siα
−
β
π+iβ (s)
where π+iα (s) = max{πiα − πi(s), 0}, then s constitutes a Nash equilibrium, that is,
πiα(s) = max
β∈Ai
πiβ(s) (∀i ∈ I).
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It is not unique that a continuous-time analogue of the iteration mapping T : S → S defined by Ti(s) = s′i for
s′iα =
siα + π+iα (s)
1+∑
β
π+iβ (s)
(∀i ∈ I, α ∈ Ai),
now described as Nash mapping, introduced in Nash’s [2] influential existence proof for equilibrium points is nothing else
than the population dynamics given above.
Accordingly, in this note, for infinite normal formal games with compact sets of strategies and continuous payoffs, we
construct Nash mappings and also prove the existence of Nash equilibria by the Tychonov fixed point theorem [5], while
Glicksberg [6] constructed best reply correspondences and established the existence of Nash equilibria by his generalized
Kakutani fixed point theorem.
2. Nash mapping and the existence of equilibria
We consider an n-person infinite normal formal game f , in which each player i has a compact metric space Xi of pure
strategies (with metric di) and a real-valued continuous payoff function fi over X = Πni=1Xi.
For each player i, denote by Si the space of mixed strategies, or probability measures on Xi, endowed with ω∗ topology,
which is a compact convex set of a locally convex linear space (see [7]). And denote by δxi the mixed strategy which assigns
probability 1 to a pure strategy xi ∈ Xi. Let S = Πni=1Si be the product space of mixed strategy profiles. For each player i, the
expect utility function on S is defined as follows: for any µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ S,
ui(µ) =
∫
X
fi(x1, x2, . . . , xn)dµ1dµ2 . . . dµn.
Clearly, ui is continuous on S by Proposition 2.1 in [8]. A mixed strategy profile µ ∈ S is called an equilibrium of the infinite
game f if for each i,
ui(µ) = max
νi∈Si
ui(νi, µ−i),
where the symbol−i denotes ‘‘all players but i’’ given a player i.
Given an infinite game f , for each i, for any µ ∈ S and for any Borel subset Bi of Xi, define
Ni(µ)(Bi) =
µi(Bi)+

Bi
max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi
1+ Xi max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi ,
where νi is a mixed profile in Si satisfying
νi({xki }) =
1
2k
, k = 1, 2, . . .
for some fixed dense countable subset Di = {xki : k = 1, 2, . . .} of compact metric space Xi. Then Ni(µ) is a mixed strategy
in Si. If Nf = (N1,N2, . . . ,Nn) then Nf : S → S is a well defined mapping.
Lemma 2.1. The mapping Nf is continuous on S and has at least one fixed point.
Proof. Since S is metrizable [7], we need only to prove that for any sequence {µk ∈ S : k = 1, 2, . . .} converging to µ ∈ S
(underω∗), {Nf (µk) : k = 1, 2, . . .} converges to Nf (µ) (underω∗), or for each i, {Ni(µk) : k = 1, 2, . . .} converges to Ni(µ)
(under ω∗).
Let gi be any real-valued continuous function on Xi. Then, for any k,∫
Xi
gidNi(µk) =

Xi
gidµki +

Xi
gi max{0, ui(δxi , µk−i)− ui(µk)}dνi
1+ Xi max{0, ui(δxi , µk−i)− ui(µk)}dνi
(cf. [9]). So the sequence {Xi gidNi(µk) : k = 1, 2, . . .} converges to
Xi
gidµi +

Xi
gi max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi
1+ Xi max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi =
∫
Xi
gidNi(µ).
That is, {Ni(µk) : k = 1, 2, . . .} converges to Ni(µ) (under ω∗). Therefore, Ni is continuous on S, and thus Nf is continuous
on S.
Since S is also a compact convex set of a locally convex linear space, by the Tychonov fixed point theorem [2], there exists
at least one fixed point of Nf . 
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Lemma 2.2. A mixed strategy profile µ is an equilibrium of infinite game f if and only if it is a fixed point of Nf .
Proof. Clearly, if µ ∈ S is an equilibrium of the game f then it is a fixed point of Nf . Then, we need to prove that if µ is a
fixed point of Nf then it is an equilibrium of the game f .
Assume that µ is a fixed point of Nf . We claim that for each i,∫
Xi
max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi = 0.
Suppose that it were not. Then, there would exist some i such that∫
Xi
max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi > 0.
Since µ is a fixed point of Nf , then for any Borel subset Bi of Xi,
µi(Bi) =

Bi
max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi
Xi
max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi
=
∑
k∈Bi∩Di
2−k max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}
∞∑
k
2−k max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}
.
It is clear that µi(Di) = 1, which also implies that if µ(xki ) > 0 (here xki ∈ Di) then ui(δxi , µ−i) > ui(µ). Hence
ui(µi, µ−i) =∑∞k=1 µ(xki )ui(δxi , µ−i) > ui(µ), the desired contradiction.1
We now prove that µ is an equilibrium.
Since for each i,∫
Xi
max{0, ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ)}dνi = 0,
by the definition of νi, it is easy to show that for any xki ∈ Di,
ui(δxki , µ−i)− ui(µ) ≤ 0.
Since Di is dense in Xi, then for any xi ∈ Xi, there is a sequence {xkmi ∈ Di : m = 1, 2, . . .} converging to xi (under di). Clearly,
the corresponding mixed strategy sequence {δxkmi : m = 1, 2, . . .} converges to δxi (under ω
∗). Since ui is continuous,
ui(δxi , µ−i)− ui(µ) ≤ 0.
Therefore, ui(µ) = maxνi∈Si ui(νi, µ−i), that is, µ is an equilibrium. 
Theorem 2.1. There exists at least one equilibrium of infinite game f .
Proof. It follows from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2.
Since the mapping Nf , which has properties of Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, is similar to the mapping T which is constructed by
Nash [2] to establish the existence of equilibria in a finite game, we call the mapping Nf a Nash mapping of the infinite game
f . 
Remark 2.1. Our method to construct a Nash mapping for an infinite game is also valid to construct a Nash mapping for a
finite game, which could be of benefit to computing Nash equilibria of a finite game.
Remark 2.2. Since the Tychonov fixed point theorem is simpler than the Glicksberg fixed point theorem, our proof of Nash
equilibria in infinite games given here is an improvement over the earlier version of Glicksberg in [6].2
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the support of PDRF of Peking University, NSF of Guizhou ([2010]2147) and DRF of Guizhou
Normal University, China. The authors would like to thank Dr. Xiaoyun Xu, two referees and the editors for their valuable
suggestions and careful reading of the manuscript.
1 A referee points out a mistake in our earlier proof and suggests this version.
2 The same referee suggests another simpler proof: given ϵ > 0, obtain using the continuity of ui , δ > 0 corresponding to ϵ and obtain a finite open
cover {Bδ{xki }}k of Xi . Consider the game G where players can only choose mixed strategies supported on {xki }k . This game has a Nash equilibrium µϵ and
we have that ui(µϵ) > ui(δxi ) − ϵ for all xi ∈ Xi . The sequence µj obtained by setting ϵ = 1/j has a convergent subsequence and its limit point is a Nash
equilibrium of the original game.
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